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Oppen’s Pragmatism
LEE SPINKS
This article oﬀers a revisionist reading of the aesthetic of the American modernist poet
George Oppen. It seeks, in the ﬁrst instance, to supplement those established readings of
Oppen that have concluded that his work is most proﬁtably understood in the discursive
contexts of American literary modernism and modern European Continental philosophy by
arguing that such approaches overlook a key indigenous intellectual inﬂuence upon his cor-
pus : that body of philosophical inquiry and cultural self-reﬂection that has come to be known
as American pragmatism. The article attempts to rectify this omission by making two simul-
taneous and complementary suggestions : ﬁrst, that pragmatic thought opens up a number of
formal and semantic questions – indeed, a number of questions about the relationship be-
tween form and meaning – that have been too little considered in recent work on American
poetry ; and second, that something crucial to Oppen’s poetry remains unthinkable without
sustained attention to the questions and claims that pragmatism places at the very heart of its
endeavour. While the relationship between pragmatist thought and Oppen’s poetics helps to
illuminate a set of concerns that lies at the very core of his aesthetic, the paper will argue, it
also reciprocally exposes the limitations of an inﬂuential genealogical vision of American
literary modernism. To support this contention it examines the ways in which a certain literary
version of American intellectual history has reinterpreted the pragmatism of William James in
the image of an Emersonian linguistic scepticism in order to establish the historical centrality
of a broadly Romantic genealogy of American modernism. The paper concludes by suggesting
that a renewed attention to the speciﬁc forms and modalities of Oppen’s poetry demonstrates
not only the inadequacy of this version of literary history to a particular tradition of American
poetics, but also promises to recover the force and distinctiveness of the American pragmatist
inheritance for succeeding generations of writers.
A century after his birth, the reputation of the American modernist poet
George Oppen is entering a period of critical consolidation. A slow but
steady stream of scholarly articles has identiﬁed and elaborated key aspects of
his aesthetic practice, a handsome new edition of his collected poems has
recently been published, and the ﬁrst critical monograph to survey the en-
tirety of his literary career appeared last year.1 Although it remains true that,
notwithstanding the award to Oppen in 1969 of the Pulitzer Prize for his
volume Of Being Numerous, he continues to be a somewhat indistinct and
University of Edinburgh.
1 See George Oppen : The Collected Poems, ed. Michael Davidson (New York: New Directions,
2002) ; and Peter Nicholls, George Oppen and the Fate of Modernism (Oxford : Oxford
University Press, 2007).
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marginal ﬁgure in the eyes of the general reading public, his work has man-
aged to evoke certain consistent lines of critical response. Certainly it is now
possible to speak in relatively assured terms of an ‘‘Objectivist ’’ Oppen, a
‘‘phenomenological ’’ Oppen, a ‘‘Heideggerean’’ Oppen, and an Oppen
whose work is in many ways consonant with the broader intellectual move-
ment of the American political left.2 Yet while these readings have been
crucial to the recuperation and revival of Oppen’s poetic reputation, I want
to argue that their common conviction that his work is most proﬁtably
understood in the context of American literary modernism and modern
European Continental philosophy overlooks a key indigenous intellectual
inﬂuence upon his work: that body of philosophical inquiry and cultural self-
reﬂection that has come to be known as American pragmatism. In the pages
that follow I wish to attempt to rectify this omission by making two simul-
taneous and complementary suggestions : ﬁrst, that pragmatic thought opens
up a number of formal and semantic questions – indeed, a number of
questions about the relationship between form and meaning – that have
been too little considered in recent work on American poetry ; and second,
that something crucial to Oppen’s poetry remains unthinkable without sus-
tained attention to the questions and claims that pragmatism places at the
very heart of its endeavour.
The relationship between pragmatist thought and Oppen’s poetics is
crucial to my argument in a number of ways. Two aspects of this conjunction
should be stressed at the outset : if, in one sense, the copula Oppen and
pragmatism helps to illuminate a set of concerns that lies at the very core of
his aesthetic, it also reciprocally exposes the limitations of an entire and
inﬂuential genealogical vision of American literary modernism. My chief
contention here will be that in order to establish the historical centrality of a
broadly Romantic genealogy of American modernism, a certain literary ver-
sion of American intellectual history has reinterpreted the pragmatism of
William James in the image of an Emersonian linguistic scepticism that has
little in common with Oppen’s own pragmatic poetics. Against this view, a
renewed attention to the speciﬁc forms and modalities of Oppen’s poetry
2 For an ‘‘objectivist ’’ reading of Oppen see Marjorie Perloﬀ, ‘‘The Shape of the Lines’ :
George Oppen and the Metric of Diﬀerence, ’’ in idem, The Dance of the Intellect : Studies in the
Poetry of the Pound Tradition (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1985), 119–34;
for a ‘‘phenomenological ’’ reading of Oppen see Paul Kenneth Naylor, ‘‘The Pre-position
‘Of’ : Being, Seeing and Knowing in George Oppen’s Poetry, ’’ Contemporary Literature, 32, 1
(Spring 1991), 100–15; for a ‘‘Heideggerean ’’ reading of Oppen see Nicholls, 62–82; and
for a reading of Oppen as an artist of the American political left see Eric Homberger,
‘‘George Oppen and the Culture of the American Left, ’’ in Burton Hatlen, ed., George
Oppen : Man and Poet (Orono, ME: University of Maine Press, 1981), 181–93.
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demonstrates not only the inadequacy of this version of literary history to
many of the ‘‘pure products of America, ’’ but also promises to recover the
force and distinctiveness of the American pragmatist inheritance for suc-
ceeding generations of writers.3
I want to begin to develop a few of these points by way of momentary
recourse to a text that is, for reasons good and ill, central to recent critical
work upon the relationship between pragmatism and American literary
modernism: Richard Poirier’s Poetry and Pragmatism. Poirier’s book is famous,
some might say notorious, for fashioning an image of pragmatism (he hovers
tellingly between the terms ‘‘pragmatism’’ and ‘‘Emersonian pragmatism’’
for reasons that will quickly become apparent) as a variety of linguistic
scepticism that became a generative principle for a particular line of
American poets whose work involved a recognition that ‘‘ language, if it is to
represent the ﬂow of individual experience, ceases to be an instrument of
clariﬁcation or of clarity and, instead, becomes the instrument of a saving
uncertainty and vagueness. ’’4 While acknowledging that William James’s
1898 Berkeley lecture ‘‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results ’’ is
credited with launching the philosophical movement called ‘‘pragmatism, ’’
Poirier’s revisionist narrative idiosyncratically recasts James as the mere point
of transmission of a series of incipiently pragmatic ideas that ﬁrst ﬂowed
from Emerson into the work of literary ﬁgures like Thoreau, Whitman, Frost
and Stevens by means of a brief and unexpected detour thorough the mod-
ernism of Gertrude Stein. Poirier turns so deﬁnitively to Emerson because
he detects in Emersonian linguistic scepticism a paradigm that ‘‘ signiﬁcantly
shapes those aspects of pragmatism which get expressed in the work of those
great twentieth-century ﬁgures. ’’5 What we see in Emerson, Poirier explains,
is an ‘‘unrelenting ﬂexibility of language ’’ wherein ‘‘meanings are emplaced
only to be edged out by alternative ones, and where the human presence
already implicit in the sounds of words can, through the very gestures that
dissolve that presence, be reﬁgured and aﬃrmed. ’’6 Poirier’s term ‘‘ linguistic
skepticism, ’’ it soon becomes clear, is designed to capture the constitutive
play of creation and de-creation that makes it possible to reveal linguistic
resources in the words and phrases we use that ‘‘point to something beyond
skepticism, to possibilities of personal and cultural renewal. ’’7 Such possi-
bilities, he continues, were eagerly seized upon by the thinker who believed,
like Emerson, that the heroic is perforce dedicated to action and whose
3 William Carlos Williams, Collected Poems I : 1909–1939 (Manchester : Carcanet, 2000), 217.
4 Richard Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism (London: Faber, 1992), 3–4.
5 Ibid., 5. 6 Ibid., 10–11. 7 Ibid., 11.
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famous deﬁnition of the cognitive process (‘‘The preamble of thought, the
transition through which it passes from the unconscious to the conscious, is
action’’) ascribed crucial quantities of activity to the becoming-conscious of
the subject itself.
Before pausing to consider both the curiousness of Poirier’s strategic re-
invention of pragmatism as Emersonian linguistic scepticism – a move that
has not passed unremarked within the philosophical and the wider intellec-
tual community – and its implications for our understanding of American
literary modernism, it is worth emphasizing the pragmatic dividend he
accrues by reconﬁguring what has been bequeathed to us as a Jamesian
inheritance in explicitly Emersonian terms.8 The ﬁrst, and perhaps pre-
eminent, beneﬁt is that it enables him to underscore what we might call the
genetic element or quantity of will-to-power that lies at the heart of life and
characterizes life as a mode of perpetual becoming. ‘‘Nothing, ’’ as Emerson
remarked in ‘‘Circles, ’’ ‘‘ is secure but life, transition, the energising spirit. ’’
To envisage the real value of life as an energising spirit that is always also a
mode of transition is to renounce those merely ﬁxed or entrenched parts of
our linguistic and cultural vocabulary that rigidify imagination into doxa and
perception into cliche´.9 To put this another way, the power and potency of
lived experience inheres in the transition between states of being, serving the
interests ‘‘not of any settled condition (the interests, say, of a determined
self) but rather those of the tendencies-in-realization latent in any given
condition. ’’10 Viewed in this light, the enigmatic and self-scrutinizing prog-
ress of Emerson’s syntax seeks simultaneously to establish and exceed the
substantive or ﬁxed points in our experience by presenting them as an always
transitional movement between two diﬀerent perceptions of life. Because the
meaning of our experience is at once present and prospective, it has no
ultimate purpose or goal ; instead we should try to develop the productive
potential of our every insight by setting it to work within the continuous
stream of our experience. By releasing the ﬂow of individual experience, in
Poirier’s words, from the control of ‘‘ any conventional or imposed or already
timed narrative sequence, ’’ existing realities are both encountered in their
material exigency and perceived as radically open to change.11 Here, in this
gesture of renunciation that also doubles as the point of transition to new
8 Stanley Cavell expresses some of his reservations about the identiﬁcation of Emerson as a
‘‘pragmatist ’’ in his essay ‘‘What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist ’’ in his
Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, ed. David Justin Hodge (Stanford : Stanford University
Press, 2003), 215–23. 9 Emerson, ‘‘Circles, ’’ in Poirier, 28.
10 Jonathan Levin, The Poetics of Transition : Emerson, Pragmatism, and American Literary Modernism
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), ix. 11 Poirier, 3.
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possibilities of living and thinking, we seem to receive an uncanny intimation
of William James’s famous representation of the ‘‘pragmatist ’’ as one who
turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to
professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insuﬃciency, from
verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from ﬁxed principles, closed systems, and
pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy,
towards facts, towards action and towards power_ It means the open air and
possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artiﬁciality, and the pretence of ﬁnality
in truth.12
This sense of anticipation or premonition is only accentuated by reading
James’s work on pragmatism in the light of Emerson’s essays. Thus in each
corpus we discover a shared insistence that immediate experience is, to echo
James T. Kloppenberg’s helpful triad of terms, always relational (it never
exists in absolute isolation but as part of a broader experiential ﬁeld), creative
(it does not passively register sense data but engenders truths by establishing
relationships between perceptions) and imbued with historically speciﬁc
cultural values (it is, that is, never blandly ‘‘human’’ or universal, but always
personal and particular in its emphasis).13 Both thinkers also display an ex-
treme scepticism about any form of foundationalism, understood here as the
attempt to establish permanent and unchanging grounds for diﬀerent forms
of knowledge, while accepting the necessary contingency of every system of
truth. Indeed, thinking is born for Emerson and James from that perception
of contingency and limitation that acknowledges that there is no absolute
origin or end that will function as a ground for truth and which asks us to
fashion a world of sense for ourselves from the press of material con-
tingencies. Crucially, both men see thinking and writing as modes of activity
that expose us to the diﬀerential forces that compose our nature and en-
courage us to act and judge diﬀerently in the world around us. As James put
the matter, in an arresting and overdetermined phrase, we must set each
word we use to work within the stream of our experience in order to realize
its ‘‘practical cash-value ’’ and conceive new ways in which existing realities
might be changed.14
Both the provoking resemblances and the profound diﬀerences between
the modalities of Emersonian linguistic scepticism and Jamesian pragmatism
are illuminated by Emerson and James’s reﬂections upon the relationship
between language and experience. The apparent, and, by James, unac-
knowledged, continuities between their respective positions appear to be
12 William James, Pragmatism (New York: Dover, 1995), 20.
13 James T. Kloppenberg, ‘‘Pragmatism: An Old Word for Some New Ways of Thinking, ’’
Journal of American History, 83, 1 (1996), 100–38, 102. 14 James, 21.
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crucial to the arguments they wish to establish. When Emerson writes in
‘‘Self-Reliance ’’ that ‘‘Life only avails, not the having lived. Power ceases in
the instant of repose ; it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a
new state, in the shooting of the gulf, in the darting to an aim, ’’ and in
‘‘Circles ’’ that ‘‘There are no ﬁxtures in nature. The universe is ﬂuid and
volatile. Permanence is but a word of degrees, ’’ he underscores a funda-
mental distinction between a vitalist power of superﬂuity and self-becoming
that his vision of ‘‘ life ’’ expresses and a cultural ‘‘ idea ’’ about life that seeks
to locate diﬀerence and becoming within a ground that might provide a
secure foundation for knowing the world.15 The same insight is given a
potentially utopian gloss in ‘‘Circles ’’ :
Our globe seen by God is a transparent law, not a mass of facts. The law dissolves
the facts and holds it ﬂuid. Our culture is the predominance of an idea which draws
after it this train of cities and institutions. Let us rise into another idea ; they will
disappear.16
One place, of course, where this cultural ‘‘ idea ’’ about life is distributed and
enforced is in the very structure of our language, which privileges predication
and communicable meaning over the tissue of connectives that make
predication meaningful in the ﬁrst place. For us to remain faithful to the
Emersonian dream of reposing in the aboriginal power of transition, then,
we must at all costs resist the unchecked expenditure of transitives in sub-
stantive terms and cash out our conjectures within a diﬀerent linguistic
economy. Emerson, like several of his successors, identiﬁes the conditions
for such an economy in the power of literature to tear perception from its
human home and oﬀer us an experience of life that is not already enclosed
within an established idea about what life should be or mean. The singularity
of literature for Emerson is that it exhibits to an extraordinary degree the
implicit role of all language in the active production of truth, knowledge and
sense. One reason why the ﬁgure of the ‘‘poet ’’ occupies such a privileged
position in Emerson’s cultural taxonomy is that he reminds us that to make
sense of ourselves is necessarily to engage in that struggle in and with
languagewhere sense is continually created and reconﬁgured by the circulating
energies of words. Emerson draws our attention to exactly this transitional
role in the making and remaking of sense when he celebrates the poet as he
who ‘‘unﬁxes the land and the sea, makes them revolve around the axis of his
primary thought, and disposes them anew. ’’17 Just as the exorbitance of
poetic vision reveals the transcendent promise of everymoment of perception,
15 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Portable Emerson, ed. Carl Bode (Harmondsworth : Penguin,
1986), 153 and 229. 16 Ibid., 229. 17 Ibid., 35.
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the superﬂuity of literary language recalls us to the transitional possibilities of
every linguistic event before it is absorbed into the regime of representation
or the carapace of the concept.
James’s sensitivity to the transitional possibilities of the linguistic event
went to the heart of his work on consciousness and the creation of sense. He
displayed this sensitivity in an instructive passage in his Principles of Psychology
where he oﬀered a brief analysis of the simple sentence ‘‘Columbus dis-
covered America in 1492. ’’18 Reﬂecting upon the fact that most readers
variously identify Columbus, America or 1492 as the topic of the sentence,
James observes that ‘‘ it is a vicious use of speech’’ either to ‘‘ take out a
substantive kernel from its content and make that its object ’’ or to ‘‘ add a
substantive kernel not articulately included in its content, and to call that its
object. ’’ The entire implication of the thought involved in this formulation
can only be expressed, James counters, in the unfolding relation of the hy-
phenated sequence ‘‘Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492. ’’ In order to
express the ‘‘delicate idiosyncracy ’’ of the unfolding relations of these words
as we perceive them, he counsels, we must ‘‘ reproduce the thought as it was
uttered, with every word fringed, and the whole sentence bathed in that
original halo of obscure relations, which, like an horizon, then spread about
its meaning. ’’19 What James calls here the ‘‘horizon’’ of the sentence is re-
ciprocally constituted by the ‘‘ fringe ’’ or ‘‘halo of obscure relations ’’ that
governs in turn the transitions between its constituent parts. Crucially, the
‘‘meaning ’’ of the sentence cannot be subtracted from these relations be-
cause it is itself nothing more than a momentary stabilization of the dynamic
eﬀects these relations are capable of producing.
In his eﬀorts to establish an analogy between the transitive rhythm of our
language and the ‘‘wonderful stream of our consciousness, ’’ James suggested
a distinction between a ‘‘ substantive ’’ and a ‘‘ transitive ’’ state of mind.20 The
substantive parts of our thinking, he explained, are the ‘‘ resting places ’’ of
thought where nouns (or ‘‘named mental states ’’) and ideas are able to hold
‘‘ sensorial imaginations ’’ before the mind ‘‘ for an indeﬁnite time. ’’
Conversely the transitive parts are the ‘‘places of ﬂight ’’ within the stream of
our thinking that are ﬁlled with ‘‘ thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that
for the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of
comparative rest. ’’ Now the principal problem in thinking about thinking,
James insists, is to ‘‘hold fast and observe the transitive parts of thought’s
18 William James, The Principles of Psychology, Volume I, ed. Frederick H. Burckhardt
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 265. I am indebted to Jonathan Levin
for his reading of this passage ; see The Poetics of Transition, 48.
19 James, The Principles of Psychology, 266. 20 Ibid., 236.
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stream’’ before they are swallowed up by the conclusion (the idea, noun or
achieved mental state) that exalts itself as the object of thought itself.
Traditional responses to this problem have taken two dominant forms:
sensationalism, which, unable to discover substantive feelings ‘‘ correspond-
ing to the innumerable relations and forms of connection between the sen-
sible things of the world, ’’ has denied that such states exist and made a fetish
of transitive sensations ; and intellectualism, which, unable to discover a
productive relation between mental states and the ‘‘ subjective tissue out of
which sensations and other substantive conditions of consciousness are
made, ’’ has eliminated any perception of transition by elevating thought to
the realm of the pure idea.21 The only proper response, James concluded, to
this baleful division of thought against itself is once more to recall its re-
lational and transitional origins :
There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic
form, or inﬂection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or
other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger
objects of our thought. If we speak objectively, it is the real relations that appear
revealed ; if we speak subjectively it is the stream of consciousness that matches each
of them by an inward cooling of its own. In either case the relations are numberless,
and no existing language is capable of doing justice to all their shades.
We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by,
quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold. Yet we do not : so
inveterate has our habit become of recognizing the existence of the substantive parts
alone, that language almost refuses to lend itself to any other use.22
Before concluding these remarks on some key tendencies in pragmatist
thought, it is worth noting an important tension, or at least diﬀerence in
emphasis, between Emersonian linguistic scepticism and Jamesian prag-
matism. Poirier’s observation that ‘‘ the democratic impulse shared by
Emersonian pragmatists also involved a recognition that language, if it is to
represent the ﬂow of individual experience, ceases to be an instrument of
clariﬁcation or of clarity and, instead, becomes the instrument of a saving
uncertainty and vagueness ’’ perfectly expresses this mode of linguistic
scepticism while advancing a claim (‘‘ceases to be an instrument of clariﬁ-
cation or of clarity ’’) that James could never endorse. Language, for James,
could never cease to be an instrument of clarity and clariﬁcation: meaning,
he insists, requires a necessary and discrete determination at the level of the
word, image or concept for the transitional energies that sustain it to be
recognized. Our experience of the world may be pluralistic all the way down,
21 Ibid., 237. 22 Ibid., 238.
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but thought only realizes itself in the objectiﬁcation of a network of relations
that will always exceed it. As he famously put the matter,
Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to be, between the
whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world
of sense about him, who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective
control under which our minds perform their operations?23
For those of us interested in the forms and phases of American literary
modernism, James’s remarks on the relationship between ‘‘ the coercions of
the world of sense ’’ and the ‘‘pressure of objective control ’’ have a sugges-
tive resonance. They appear curiously to anticipate the ‘‘Objectivist ’’ turn in
American poetics propounded by Louis Zukofsky in which ‘‘objectiﬁcation’’
named a concern with the ‘‘ shape ’’ of the poem and the ‘‘ resolving of words
and their ideation into structure. ’’24 The object of objectiﬁcation for
Zukofsky was the poem itself, which resolved its internal constituents into
the ‘‘clarity of image and word-tone. ’’25 Or, as Zukosky himself expressed
the matter, ‘‘The rested totality may be called objectiﬁcation – the appre-
hension satisﬁed completely as to the appearance of the art form as an
object. ’’26
I want to explore the relationship between pragmatist thought and
American literary modernism by examining two very diﬀerent poems by
George Oppen, Zukofsky’s friend, sometime collaborator and occasional
antagonist. Oppen’s well-attested diﬀerences with objectivist practices will
not detain me here, although something of their quality may be glimpsed in a
1960 letter he wrote to Cid Corman on the subject of poetic form:
In any case I believe you are thinking more positively than I am of a certain solidity
of surface. I think of form as immediacy, as the possibility of being grasped. I look
for the thinnest possible surface – at times, no doubt, too thin : a hole, a lapse. It is
that what you mean by a ‘‘ slackening of language. ’’ There is no point in defending
lapses – but that is, of all the risks the one I plan to live with. I am much more afraid
of a solid mass of words.27
What interests me here is that poetic form for Oppen is anything but
Zukofsky’s ‘‘ rested totality. ’’28 Instead of ‘‘a sort of solidity of surface, ’’ he
23 James, Pragmatism, 90.
24 Louis Zukofsky, ‘‘Sincerity and Objectiﬁcation, ’’ Poetry, 37, 5 (Feb. 1931), 273, 274.
25 Ibid., 272. 26 Ibid., 274.
27 George Oppen, The Selected Letters of George Oppen, ed. Rachel Blau DuPlessis (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1990), 40.
28 It should perhaps be noted that recent scholarship upon Zukofsky has tended to empha-
size his consciousness of both the ﬂuidity and the dialectical possibilities of poetic form at
the expense of any notion of a ‘‘ rested totality ’’ of objectiﬁed particulars. Thus Tim Woods
in his reading of ‘‘A’’ suggests that Zukofsky’s ‘‘ strategy of writing ’’ in that poem is ‘‘ a
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looks for ‘‘ the thinnest possible surface, ’’ a notion of form that at certain
points takes the form of a ‘‘hole, a lapse. ’’ Intriguingly, moreover, form is
conceived transitively as both ‘‘ immediacy ’’ and ‘‘ the possibility of being
grasped. ’’
In the space remaining to me I want to consider how Oppen’s remarks on
form, conceptuality and sense might illuminate key aspects of his poetry
while shedding a certain light on their intellectual background and history. So
let us begin by examining a short poem from Oppen’s 1934 collectionDiscrete
Series :
She lies, hip high,
On a ﬂat bed
While the after-
Sun passes.
Plant, I breathe –
O Clearly.
Eyes legs arms hands ﬁngers,
Simple legs in silk.
This is, on the face of it, a rather unassuming poem. Yet despite its sim-
plicity of diction and quietness of tone, it nevertheless confronts us with
some of the diﬃculties that inﬂect much of Oppen’s writing. The ﬁrst dif-
ﬁculty the poem presents, if we can use so singular a term for so pervasive a
problem, involves the need for the type of pragmatic decision that goes to
the very heart of every encounter with certain types of poetic language : how
are we to secure a degree of narrative sense from a style of writing that simul-
taneously respects and ﬂouts the protocols of subject–predicate grammar?
This question leads quickly in turn to other questions. Which part of speech,
to put the matter more narrowly, would need to be aligned with which other
part of speech for the subject of this particular poem to come into focus?
And what common semantic ground, in a poem which seems both presently
and retrospectively absorbed with the ﬁnding of common ground, can be
found between two present-tense narrative declarations that share the same
subjective origin while extending very diﬀerent poetic images of their shared
subjective world?
That Oppen was perfectly aware of the diﬃculties poems like these pres-
ented to his readers is clear from a 1969 interview in which he expounded
means by which fragments can combat totality by insisting on negativity and yet can
maintain an informing process of ‘comprehensive ’ social interrelations. ’’ Tim Woods, The
Poetics of the Limit : Ethics and Politics in Modern And Contemporary American Poetry (Basingstoke :
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 60.
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brieﬂy upon the phrase ‘‘discrete series ’’ that gave his ﬁrst volume its title in
terms that shed an oblique light upon the enigmatic and fragmentary
character of its contents :
My book, of course, was called Discrete Series. That’s a phrase in mathematics. A pure
mathematic series would be one in which each term would be derived from the
preceding term by a rule. A discrete series is a series of terms each of which is
empirically derived, each of which is empirically true. And this is the reason for the
fragmentary character of those poems. I was attempting to construct a meaning by
empirical statements, by imagist statements.29
My attention is held here by the implicitly pragmatic nature of this meth-
odological statement. Oppen is at pains in this extract to establish a clear
connection between empirical discretion (‘‘A discrete series is a series of
terms each of which is empirically derived, each of which is empirically
true ’’), truth, and what he calls ‘‘ the fragmentary character of these poems. ’’
Certainly the ‘‘ truth ’’ of the terms that his poem puts into play appears
entirely dependent upon this notion of empirical discretion. The meanings of
these terms are not enclosed within, or determined by, an already existing
rule ; the rules that govern the production of aesthetic truth are precisely
what the poetic scene – the collection of empirical statements that make the
poem a ‘‘poem’’ – is there to establish. For Oppen here, as for pragmatist
thought more generally, truth is not a merely interior or stagnant property
within an idea or perception: truth is a pragmatic mode of becoming ; truth is
something that becomes true ; truth, indeed, is something that is made true by
events. To establish the truth of something by empirical statements is, to
venture tentatively for a moment into the future anterior tense, to see truth
as an event, as a mode of transition, as a way of productively linking per-
ceptual instants and particulars, a way, that is, of leading us towards that
which in a discrete instance or event it will be useful to have known.
The pragmatic problem of how to construct a meaning from a discrete
series of perceptual particulars is accentuated by Oppen’s dramatic mode of
presentation which thrusts us directly into the midst of a poetic scene with-
out any formal sense of the way that this scene is expected to develop. We
need to be a little circumspect here : the ‘‘problem’’ occupying my attention
is not, in a primary sense, a matter of narrative detail, but rather a detail of the
passage between narrative details that discloses something of the enigma of
our experience (or, if you prefer, the ‘‘worlding ’’ of our world). The poem
opens abruptly upon the scene of what seems to be an erotic tryst : a woman
29 L. S. Dembo, ‘‘The Objectivist Poet : Four Interviews, ’’ Contemporary Literature, 10, 2
(Spring 1969), 155–219, 161.
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lies ‘‘hip high’’ upon a bed, her legs sheathed in what are presumably ‘‘ silk ’’
stockings, while the sun sets upon an afternoon of desultory lovemaking. Yet
if the erotic subject of the text can be quite simply stated – and Oppen will
return with ironic deliberateness to the adjective ‘‘ simple ’’ in the poem’s ﬁnal
line – the relationship between its two poetic sentences so crucial to its
meaning remains persistently opaque. The origin of this opacity lies in the
lexical transition between the untroubled predication of the establishing
statement ‘‘She lies, hip high, / on a ﬂat bed’’ and the scrambled syntax of
the second sentence ‘‘Plant, I breathe – / O clearly, ’’ where, contrary to the
speaker’s emphatic declaration, nothing now is particularly clear except
the expression of a sexual urgency that comes to dominate the scene at
the expense of the discretely perceived subject who ﬁrst provoked it.
Transposing the eight lines of the poem into prose, as Marjorie Perloﬀ has
demonstrated, makes matters no clearer : even after successive readings the
two prose sentences ‘‘She lies, hip high, on a ﬂat bed while the after-sun
passes. Plant, I breathe – O clearly, eyes legs arms hands ﬁngers, simple legs
in silk ’’ resolutely resist summary explication.30
The fragmentary character of Oppen’s poem consists in this instance,
then, in the way the second of these two empirical statements disorders the
syntactic expectations established by its precursor. What also needs to be
recognized is that the profound disjunction between these statements es-
tablishes a set of linguistic conditions that have a necessary pragmatic en-
tailment for each of the poem’s readers. This pragmatic consequence may be
presented in the following terms: if there no longer exists a rule or con-
vention beyond the discontinuous parts of speech that constitute the two
stanzas before us – no shared grammatical or prosodic expectation, that is,
that enables us to pass securely from one stanza to the other – we are bound
to see the poem (and the world that the poem portrays) as the interpretative
eﬀect of the series of links and transitions that underpin the structure of their
own poetic ﬁeld. To see the poetic ﬁeld in this way is to understand with
renewed clarity why Oppen professed such enduring faith in the ‘‘ small
words ’’ that, he insisted, govern the transition between, and the limits of, our
modes of worldly experience. In order to develop this line of thought for a
few moments, I want brieﬂy to focus upon the poem’s deployment of four
small words and a curiously hyphenated compound phrase. My reading is
guided throughout by one basic principle : notwithstanding those points in
the poem where our hope of syntactic continuity appears destined to be
30 Perloﬀ, The Dance of the Intellect, 124.
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frustrated, close attention to the modulated transitions of meaning expressed
by the poem’s pattern of sounds reveals crucial elements of its semantic
structure. Reading the poem aloud, for instance, the ear is caught by the
phonemic chiming of the low central vowel-sound ‘‘ay ’’ in ‘‘ lies, ’’ ‘‘high, ’’
‘‘while ’’ and ‘‘ I. ’’ My impression that this pattern of assonantal echoes and
associations is crucial to the poem’s development is reinforced by the way it
draws together a noun and an adjective that denote the physical and spatial
disposition of the desired female subject, a conjunction that works to
underscore our sense of the continuous present in which the speaker’s
awareness of this subject unfolds, and a pronoun that brings the speaker’s
own subjectivity initially into view. The signiﬁcance of this sonic conﬁgur-
ation can now be put in summary terms: as we trace the progress of the ‘‘ ay ’’
vowel through the various stages of the poem, we are aﬀorded a tentative
glimpse of the way the speaker constructs an image of himself as a discrete
and observing subject from the active ﬂow of life. A glance plays across
a raised expanse of sunlit ﬂesh, the perception in turn provokes an
aﬀective response which is subsequently recomposed by the time of
contemplation (‘‘while the after- / sun passes ’’) as the ground for the dis-
tinct sexual subjectivity that then attempts to narrate the experience to its
readers.
Yet to describe the poem’s mode of disclosure in such unhesitating nar-
rative terms is only to tell half of its story. Because our images of experience
are continually ﬁgured and reconﬁgured by the ﬂow of perceptual instants
and particulars they contain, they remain inherently stable and open to
change. Something of this sense of a poetic image simultaneously forged and
reconﬁgured in the transition between perceptions is expressed by the curi-
ous adjectival construction ‘‘after- / sun’’ in which the singularity of the
common noun ‘‘afternoon’’ is suddenly divided from within itself by the
apprehension of a time to come (presumably twilight, a period in which we
are simultaneously within and beyond the hours of daylight) in its diﬀerence
from which the experience of afternoon derives elements of its meaning.
Precisely the same oscillation between transitive and substantive states of
being is caught in the poem’s two concluding lines where the relation be-
tween sexual subjects once so explicitly and triumphantly proclaimed (‘‘O
clearly ’’) abruptly dissolves into the series of aﬀects and perceptions from
which it was originally composed. One reason why, in Marjorie Perloﬀ’s
words, an initial narrative paraphrase of the poem’s contents ‘‘makes no
sense ’’ now suddenly becomes clear : each of the two halves of the poem
derives its pragmatic rules of engagement from the empirical situation in
which it ﬁnds itself implicated, and these two situations describe two very
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diﬀerent stages in the process of subject formation that the poem seeks to
unfold.31
A recurrent, and recurrently crucial, feature of Oppen’s later poetry is its
extension of these reﬂections upon the phenomenology of perception and the
complexities of subjective self-constitution into a more general meditation
upon the fundamental ground or foundation of ethical and political life. The
poems collected in The Materials, This in Which and Of Being Numerous return
consistently to the question of whether or not any unchanging or a priori
postulates or commitments may be established prior to our ongoing cultural
conversation about the nature of our norms and values that might constitute a
universal ground for these norms and values. Although Oppen’s poetic
examination of the fundamental ground of knowledge and value takes a var-
iety of forms, it is remarkable how often his work presents the desire for an
absolute foundation for action and judgement as the motor of social and
political division. We might, if we were so minded, discern in this anti-foun-
dationalist tendency of Oppen’s poetry an echo ofWilliam James’s conviction
that, in Jonathan Levin’s words, ‘‘Life is not modelled on a thing or a con-
dition, but rather on a dynamic process ’’ in which we ‘‘are most alive in the
transitions that link past and future, in a continuation that is also a trans-
formation. ’’32 However, while Oppen’s writing reproduces James’s attent-
iveness to transition and the active dynamic at the heart of life, it also gives it
an emphatically material dimension: no proposition, truth or value, it sug-
gests, may be thought to have any meaning whatsoever outside the structure
of relations that constitute the ground for particular propositions, truths and
values to function within a determinate social and historical context. A signal
advantage of exchanging the phrase ‘‘ structure of relations ’’ for the more
narrowly phenomenological ascription ‘‘mode of transition’’ is that it enables
us to grasp the thickly materialist residue ofOppen’s pragmatic attachments in
which the relations between words and things always retain the impression of
the collective human contexts that produce them, and which, in our era of
advanced technological instrumentality, may also bring them to a ﬁnal end.
Oppen’s enduring fascination with the structure of relations that precede
and exceed our ethical and epistemological foundations receives rich and
complex expression in ‘‘Leviathan, ’’ the poem that concludes his second
volume The Materials :
Truth also is the pursuit of it :
Like happiness, and it will not stand.
31 Ibid., 124. 32 Levin, The Poetics of Transition, 45.
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Even the verse begins to eat away
In the acid. Pursuit, pursuit ;
A wind moves a little,
Moving in a circle, very cold.
How shall we say?
In ordinary discourse –
We must talk now. I am no longer sure of the words,
The clockwork of the world. What is inexplicable
Is the ‘‘preponderance of objects. ’’ The sky lights
Daily with that predominance
And we have become the present.
We must talk now. Fear
Is fear. But we abandon one another.
To read this poem is directly to encounter one recurrent aspect of the style
of Oppen’s middle period in which a series of propositional (one might,
indeed, say foundational) statements are simultaneously asserted and placed
radically into question. This stylistic vacillation between declaration and
dissembling is apparent from the enigma posed by the poem’s extraordinary
opening sentence. One thing, at the very most, is clear : in order to make
rudimentary sense of the declaration forcefully proposed in these ﬁrst two
lines, we need to determine both the proper relationship between noun, verb
and pronoun in the statement ‘‘Truth also is the pursuit of it ’’ and the nature
of the semantic work performed by the colon that seeks to establish a con-
tiguous relationship between the two principal clauses of these lines. Yet it is
precisely the character of these types of relationship – and, indeed, the re-
lations between semantic units more generally – that the poem consistently
refuses to resolve. This refusal is indicated by Oppen’s introduction of a
semantically undetermined and place-holding pronoun at the end of line one
which appears designed to drain the rhetorical relationship between noun
and verb of positive content, an eﬀect reinforced by the redeployment of
exactly the same pronominal manoeuvre in the concluding phrase of line
two. This state of semantic dubiety is further intensiﬁed, rather than ex-
punged, by the quasi-prepositional use of the adverb ‘‘ like ’’ at the beginning
of the second line, the implied sense of which (‘‘ the pursuit of truth is like
happiness ’’) ushers in a number of supplementary questions (‘‘how is ‘ truth ’
like ‘happiness ’, ’’ for example) that gradually unsettle the declarative foun-
dations of the entire proposition.
The claim I want to make here is that the syntactical and semantic com-
plexities of Oppen’s mode of disclosure, a mode that expresses itself by a
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convulsive troping or twisting of the apparently already given into something
at once deeply familiar and persistently strange, are crucial to his formal
explication of his pragmatic inheritance. If poetic form for Oppen oﬀers a
way of materializing or capturing the movement and texture of thought, it
does so by suspending us momentarily within the structure of relations that
constitute and delimit the pragmatic ground of our every constative utter-
ance. Oppen’s scrupulous sense of the event of thought as a reciprocal play
between structure and relation can be glimpsed in the poem’s opening line. It
appears with particular force in the teasing equivocation between noun-
phrase and pronoun at the heart of the declarative proposition that seeks to
constitute the poem’s discursive foundation. Despite our deeply held desire
to locate the essence of truth (its iterability, if you will) in an already existing
rule, truth, the opening noun-phrase suggests, is never just one thing. Truth,
it tells us, also is this : if the adverb ‘‘also ’’ is to have any meaning, it lies in the
implication that truth is always already doubled, at least always opens itself to
the possibility of being doubled or pluralized, and this supplementary force
or resonance can be traced both in the transition between substantive po-
sitions and in themovement towards (or ‘‘pursuit ’’ of) an unspeciﬁed, because
ultimately unreachable, destination. Truth-eﬀects, in this sense, are produced
in the search for their own ground and their own legitimation; they suspend
themselves between nouns and actively express themselves in the detour
through verbs that propels us towards the interpretative future of our own
utterances. Neither a Platonic form nor a determined historical essence, truth
remains an ongoing pursuit ; like happiness it will not ‘‘ stand’’ as either the
unchanging regulative principle of a body of knowledge or the absolute
moral foundation of a polity or people. But should we wish it to? If some-
thing ‘‘ in ’’ truth is incalculable and heterogeneous at the source, if part of the
meaning of truth arrives from the future contexts in which it will be re-
fashioned and contested, is not something of its potency and promise lost in
the exigency of a present determination? Momentarily reversing the terms of
the second line, is not the aﬀect produced by the realization that the truth
‘‘will not stand’’ as an absolute foundation or ground like happiness an ex-
perience of loss that always also extends the possibility of potential plenitude
in a poem otherwise preoccupied with acid, clockwork motion and an
apocalyptic intimation of the end of the historical sense?
The self-questioning beginning of ‘‘Leviathan’’ illustrates a deﬁning fea-
ture of the pragmatic gambit central to the poem’s unfolding, which is to
embrace a radical sense of limitation upon one level (the loss of a stable
epistemological ground for rhetoric and reference) in order to evade it at
another (the enclosure of the possibilities of sense within a determinate
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historical horizon). To this end, the poem plays oﬀ two very diﬀerent senses
of limitation in the trope ‘‘pursuit, pursuit ’’ which juxtaposes the groundless
ground of pragmatic deliberation to the dominant political metanarrative
of Cold War discourse. It does so in order to confront us once again with
the implicit challenge laid down both by its self-reﬂexive opening and by the
self-reﬂexive beginning of the revolutionary American settler discourse of
self-discovery and self-legitimation: to what extent are we still capable of
responding to the emancipatory promise of those extraordinary injunctions
‘‘ life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness ’’ within the ‘‘ordinary discourse ’’
that deﬁnes our days? What makes this response at once crucial to attempt
and diﬃcult to sustain is that this ‘‘ordinary discourse ’’ has been contami-
nated by the binary logic and self-consolidating protocols of Cold War
rhetoric. So profound has this contamination been, Oppen’s poem suggests,
that it has transformed our thinking about nature and culture alike : the very
words that compose ‘‘Leviathan’’ and the foundational document it re-
conﬁgures are being eaten away by the ‘‘ acid ’’ currently coursing through the
veins of the American body politic, while a ‘‘very cold ’’ wind encircles its
dull and featureless landscape. Crucially, the corrosive eﬀects engendered by
Cold War discourse upon our habits of life and thought are reproduced at a
very basic level in the words we use which have become denuded of subtlety,
shorn of nuance – cogs in the mere ‘‘clockwork ’’ of the world. ‘‘For
pluralistic pragmatism, ’’ William James remarked near the conclusion of his
brief survey of the subject,
truth grows up inside of all the ﬁnite experiences. They lean on each other, but the
whole of them, if such a whole there be, leans on nothing. All ‘‘homes ’’ are in ﬁnite
experience ; ﬁnite experience as such is homeless. Nothing outside of the ﬂux se-
cures the issue of it. It can hope salvation only from its own intrinsic promises and
potencies.33
Half a century later, at the end of the 1950s, James’s vision of the ‘‘home-
less ’’ ﬂux of potential experience is already being relocated and rationalized
in Oppen’s poem by an ideological matrix that works to redeﬁne the promise
and potency of futurity upon its own political terms. This idea of a disturb-
ance or abbreviation of our sense of future time is a persistent motif in the
poem. Something, indeed, has occurred to shake the foundation of any
thought of a possible future (and any possible future of thought) by sub-
jecting life to the apocalyptic armoury of our political masters. ‘‘What is
inexplicable, ’’ Oppen reminds us with melancholy understatement halfway
through the poem, ‘‘ is the ‘preponderance of objects, ’ ’’ a tense and impacted
33 James, Pragmatism, 100.
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little phrase that has nevertheless the scope to encompass memories of the
nuclear arms race of the 1950s. We live, here, now, beneath an ‘‘ inexplic-
able ’’ preponderance of objects : such ‘‘preponderance ’’ is inexplicable be-
cause the potential devastation it preﬁgures is unthinkable in political terms,
but also because the detonation of any one of these objects appears likely to
bring the business of thinking to an ultimate end. In the darkness cast by the
nuclear shadow, then, objects lie before us (or are preponderant) in a double
sense insofar as they exist both as material for contemplation and as an image
of life already determined by the calculation of its own political end.
To read the poem in this way, in which the ‘‘preponderance’’ of objects
gradually assumes the appalling majesty of a sky lit daily by the ‘‘predomi-
nance ’’ or premonition of its eschatological freight, is to arrive at a melan-
choly and seemingly inexorable conclusion about human capacities and
hopes. Such a conclusion is supported, rather than unsettled, by the poem’s
laconic and airless ﬁnal lines, with their talk of compulsion, fear and aban-
donment. But in these closing remarks I want to suggest that ‘‘Leviathan’’
also oﬀers a much more positive, and pragmatic, vision of human potential, a
vision consonant with Richard Poirier’s insistence that ‘‘ If pragmatism
works, then it works the way poetry does – by eﬀecting a change of language,
a change carried out entirely within language, and for the beneﬁt of those
destined to inherit the language. ’’34 This supplementary reading would begin
by echoing once again William James’s description of the ‘‘pragmatic
method’’ as a mode of invigilation in which we ‘‘bring out of each word its
practical cash-value ’’ and ‘‘ set it at work within the stream of our experi-
ence ’’ so that it appears ‘‘ less as a solution_ than as a program for more
work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing
realities can be changed. ’’35 It would develop by teasing out the ways Oppen’s
poetic style, wherein supple shadings of tone and idiom emplace meanings
only for them to be edged out or contested by alternative ones, restates and
reaﬃrms the possibility of a life other than this one at the very moment such
a possibility seems upon the point of eclipse. It would attend once more to
the complex economy between truth, pursuit and groundlessness that the
poem initially sets into play, examine those phases of its argument where the
transition between substantive positions leaves an excess or residue of
meaning (‘‘A wind moves a little ’’) unaccounted for by those positions,
scrutinize those moments of rhetorical obstruction or blockage (‘‘What is
inexplicable / is the ‘preponderance of objects ’ ’’) that challenge the smooth
ﬂow of narrative rationalization, and consider how far the emphasis Oppen
34 Poirier, Poetry and Pragmatism, 132. 35 James, Pragmatism, 21.
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places upon the becoming or political constitution of a mode of life (‘‘And
we have become the present ’’) allows us to dream of another mode of life
unconstrained by the ‘‘preponderance ’’ of objects or the reﬂexive platitudes
of political self-regulation and conformity (‘‘We must talk now’’).
Rather like the three abstract nouns whose enigmatic provocation still
radiates from the core of the ‘‘Declaration of Independence, ’’ a poem such
as ‘‘Leviathan’’ bequeaths us a complex and demanding legacy. But as
Jacques Derrida reminds us, ‘‘ If the readability of a legacy were given,
natural, transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and at the same time defy
interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit from it. ’’36 Although
these complexities and this demand will, I hope, long detain us, something in
them comes clear when we recognize that there is at the heart of Oppen’s
lapidary, self-questioning and ‘‘objectivist ’’ poetics an aesthetic response to
the pragmatist notion of truth as ‘‘ something essentially bound up with the
way in which one moment in our experience may lead us towards other
moments which it will have been useful to have been led to. ’’37 We might
make this connection in another way. At the very end of Pragmatism William
James quotes a Greek epigram that admirably crystallizes for him an irre-
ducible element of the human (and pragmatic) imagination:
A shipwrecked sailor, buried on this coast,
Bid you set sail.
Full many a gallant bark, when we were lost,
Weathered the gale.38
Pragmatism, James concludes, begins from the need to respond to this
experience of ﬂux and transition; it envisages the absolute or the sacred as a
potential, not an origin ; it sees us shipwrecked upon a planet whose meaning
is never merely given to us ; and it challenges us to begin from this experience
of shipwreck, loss and abandonment while treating this experience as the
positive precondition for the vision of another possible world. Obsessed and
bewildered as he was by what he called ‘‘ the shipwreck / of the singular, ’’
Oppen’s response to this pragmatic imperative remains one of the still-to-be-
examined foundations upon which his reputation will eventually rest.39
36 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx : The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and the New
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994), 16.
37 James, Pragmatism, 79. 38 Ibid., 114.
39 George Oppen, George Oppen : New Collected Poems, ed. Michael Davidson (New York:
New Directions, 2002), 166.
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